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Abstract
This paper studies the problem of distributed optimal coordination (DOC) for a class of nonlinear large-scale cyber-physical
systems (CPSs) in the presence of cyber attacks. A secure DOC architecture with attack diagnosis is proposed that guarantees
the attack-free subsystems to achieve the output consensus which minimizes the sum of their objective functions, while the
attacked subsystems converge to preset secure states. A two-layer DOC structure is established with emphasis on the interactions
between cyber and physical layers, where a command-driven control law is designed that generates provable optimal output
consensus. Differing from the existing fault diagnosis methods which are generally applicable to given failure types, the focus of
the attack diagnosis is to achieve detection and isolation for arbitrarymalicious behaviors. To this end, double coupling residuals
are generated by a carefully-designed distributed filter. The adaptive thresholds with prescribed performance are designed
to enhance the detectability and isolability. It is theoretically guaranteed that any attack signal cannot bypass the designed
attack diagnosis methodology to destroy the convergence of the DOC algorithm, and the locally-occurring detectable attack
can be isolated from the propagating attacks from neighboring subsystems. Simulation results for the motion coordination of
multiple remotely operated underwater vehicles illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed architecture.
Key words: Cyber-physical systems, distributed optimization, attack diagnosis, nonlinear systems, adaptive control.
1 Introduction
Recently, Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), which closely
connect cyber and physical worlds, have gained much
research interest in many fields, such as computer field,
control field, battle field. By utilizing the close interac-
tion between cyber and physical parts, the “intelligence”
of physical systems can be sufficiently enhanced in order
to fulfil some complex, precise or dangerous tasks, such
as remote diagnosis, deep sea exploration [1]. However,
the networked connection between cyber and physical
parts also often leads to large attack space, such that
the CPSs are vulnerable to various types of adversarial
attacks. Some famous examples such as the Maroochy
water breach [2] and Stuxnet [3] indicate the CPS secu-
rity as a fundamental issue to be studied.
With potential applications of distributed optimiza-
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tion in large-scale CPSs [21], many important results
on discrete- or continuous-time DO algorithms have
been reported [4,5,6,7,8]. In these algorithms, each in-
dividual (or said agent in multi-agent systems) only
performs the designed optimization dynamics, ignoring
its own dynamics. Note that the physical dynamic sys-
tems are usually indispensable parts for achieving DO
task, such as the cooperative search of radio sources
[9], the motion coordination [14] and the distributed
optimal power flow [10,11]. Hence, it is relevant to
study the distributed optimization problems together
with physical dynamics, termed distributed optimal co-
ordination (DOC). In fact, the DOC can be completed
based on the CPS architecture by effectively combining
of cyber computation/communication and physical dy-
namics/control [12]. Recently, many important results
for DOC have been reported for multi-agent system
with various physical dynamics by designing integrated
closed-loop control laws, such as integrator-type dynam-
ics [13,14,15], continuous-time linear dynamics [16,17],
Euler-Lagrangian dynamics [12]. More references for
DOC can be found in [18]. Motivated by these and
considering the non-ignorable nonlinear uncertain dy-
namics in many physical agents [40,41,12], this paper
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investigates the DOC problem for a class of certain
nonlinear large-scale systems on the CPS platforms.
Given the growing threat of malicious attacks in large-
scale (and safety-critical) CPSs, the vulnerability of
consensus-based DOC algorithms is also with respect to
cyber attacks. Hence, the other main objective of this
paper is to address the issue of security of consensus-
based DOC dynamics by providing certain safety guar-
antees based on attack diagnosis. The recent works
[20,21,22] also consider the problem of resilient DO un-
der different adversarial models than the ones that we
consider here, and the agent’s own physical dynamics
is not considered there. Other related important works
on distributed/decentralized sensor fault diagnosis and
secure state estimation against sensor attacks for large-
scale CPSs have been reported in [24,25,26,27,28,29,30].
In the existing fault diagnosis and fault-tolerant results,
the fault detectors are in general designed for given fail-
ure types [42,43], such as loss of effectiveness [27], bias
faults [24,25,26]. As we will see later, in our problem for-
mulation the attack model can be considered to contain
infinite number of failure types and one cannot afford to
construct a fault detector for each possible failure type.
In [28,29,30], the attack-resilient mechanisms are de-
signed in the presence of arbitrary adversarial behaviors
under the framework of distributed estimation, outside
of DOC framework.
In this paper, we propose a secure DOC architecture for
a class of nonlinear large-scale CPSs in the presence of
cyber attacks. The overall architecture consists of cy-
ber and physical parts, and each physical subsystem is
modeled as a nonlinear parametric strict-feedback sys-
tem equipped with a dedicated decision-making agent
in the cyber superstratum. The cyber core (multi-agent
network) focuses on the design of DOC and attack diag-
nosis, and the physical part performs the corresponding
optimization task following the cyber-core control com-
mand. The objective is to steer the physical systems to
achieve the output consensus at the minimizer of a given
team performance function in a distributed fashion and
provide certain safety guarantees based on attack diag-
nosis. The contributions of this paper are threefold.
The first contribution of this paper is, differing from the
existing integrated closed-loop control schemes proposed
in [12,13,14,15,16,17], to propose a two-layerDOC struc-
ture where the cyber-layer optimizer generates a con-
trol command which is transmitted to the physical-layer
control for local regulation. To overcome the difficulty
caused by the dynamic mismatch between the tradi-
tional DO algorithms [4,5,6,7,8] and adaptive backstep-
ping control systems [36,37,38,39], a novel command-
driven control strategy is designed. It is proved that the
proposed algorithm ensures all subsystems to achieve
the optimal consensus under the healthy (attack-free)
environment.
As the second contribution, we provide the design and
analysis of an attack detection and isolation (ADI)
methodology. The existing fault diagnosis schemes are
usually designed for given fault types [42,43] and can-
not guarantee the detectability for arbitrary malicious
behaviors in theory. Also, due to the coupling effects of
multiple propagated attacks on the physical dynamics
and cyber dynamics which are interacted, the attack
isolation becomes more challenging. To this end, double
coupling residuals and analytical redundancy relations
(ARRs) are generated by a carefully-designed dis-
tributed filter. The adaptive thresholds with prescribed
performance are designed to enhance the detectability
and isolability. It is theoretically guaranteed that any
attack signal cannot bypass the ADI methodology to
destroy the convergence of the DOC algorithm, and
the locally-occurring detectable attacks can be isolated
from the propagating attacks from the neighboring
subsystems.
The last contribution is to develop a secure version of the
DOC protocol based on the ADI methodology, which can
provide a safety guarantee in the sense that the healthy
physical subsystems (satisfying ARRs) reach the output
consensus at the optimal solution of the sum of their ob-
jective functions, while the attacked physical subsystems
(not satisfying ARRs) converge to preset secure states.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
The symbols R and B denote the set of real and Boolean
numbers, respectively. Cnm represents the set of n-order
differentiable m-dimension function vectors. The cardi-
nality of a set S is denoted by |S|. ⊗ and ◦ stand for
the Kronecker product and Hadamard product, respec-
tively. For a given time interval Ξ, ν(Ξ) represents its
Lebesgue measure. sgn(·) represents the sign function.
Denote 1N = [1, · · · , 1]T ∈ RN . For a vector sequence
{Y (j)}Nj=1, we denote the notation Y = vec(Y (1), · · · ,
Y (N)) if not specified.
2.2 Graph theory
A weighted undirected graph G = (V , E , A) consists of
N vertices (or nodes, or agents in multi-agent networks)
V = {v1, · · · , vN}, a set of edges (or links) E ⊂ V×V and
an adjacency matrix A = {wij}N×N with nonnegative
element wij > 0 if (vi, vj) ∈ E and wij = 0 otherwise.
The neighbors of vertex vi ∈ V are denoted by the set
Ni = {vj ∈ V : (vj , vi) ∈ E}. The Laplacian matrix
L = (lij)N×N associated with graph G is defined as lii =∑N
j=1 wij and lij = −wij for i 6= j. For an undirected
graph, the matrix L is symmetric and semi-positive. A
path from vertex vi to vertex vj in graph G is a sequence
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of edges (vi, vi1), (vi1 , vi2), · · · , (vik , vj) in the graphwith
distinct nodes vik ∈ V . An undirected graph is connected
if there is a path from every vertex to other vertex in the
graph.
3 DOC architecture
Consider a CPS consisting ofN subsystems, which aims
at achieving the DOC task. The jth subsystem, j =
1, · · · , N is described by the pair (P(j), C(j)), where C(j)
denotes the cyber part which is responsible for task
decision-making, while P(j) denotes the physical part
which is responsible for task execution. The physical part
P(j) is modeled as a nonlinear dynamical system
Σ(j) :


x˙
(j)
i (t) =x
(j)
i+1(t) + ϕ
(j)
i (x¯
(j)
i (t))θj
x˙(j)n (t) =βju
(j)(t) + ϕ(j)n (x
(j)(t))θj ,
y(j)(t) =x
(j)
1 (t) + a
(j)(t)
(1)
where i = 1, · · · , n − 1, x(j)i (t) ∈ Rm, x¯(j)i (t) =
vec(x
(j)
1 (t), · · · , x(j)i (t))∈ Rim, x(j)(t) = vec(x(j)1 (t), · · · ,
x
(j)
n (t)) ∈ Rnm is the measurable state; u(j)(t) ∈ Rm is
the control input; ϕ
(j)
i (x¯
(j)(t)) ∈ Rm×p and βj ∈ Rm×m
are known nonsingular matrix; θj ∈ Rp is unknown con-
stant; y(j)(t) ∈ Rm is the output measurement trans-
mitted to the cyber superstratum through a wireless
network channel and a(j)(t) ∈ Rm denotes the cyber at-
tacks corrupting the sensor transmitting signal. In par-
ticular, in order to provide security guarantees against
worst case adversarial behavior, we allow the adversarial
attacker to know the overall systemmodel, system state,
control input and the possible fault detector D (e.g.,
distributed adaptive observers [24,25,26]) equipped on
the CPS. Thus, the attack signal can be modeled as
a(j)(t) = κ(j)(t− T (j)a )φ(j)(x(t), u(t),D, t− T (j)a )
where κ(j)(t) is the time profile and φ(j)(·, ·, ·, ·) ∈ Rm is
an unknown function that occurs at the unknown time
instant T
(j)
a . We make no assumption on φ(j)(·, ·, ·, ·),
which may be any (such as unbounded, discontinuous)
function vector. The time profile of the attack is mod-
eled as κ(j)(r) = 0 if r < 0 and κ(j)(r) = 1 otherwise.
Multiple cyber attacks may occur simultaneously or se-
quentially, for example, T
(1)
a ≤ · · · ≤ T (j
′)
a with j′ ≤ N .
Remark 1. System (1) can represent many practical
systems such as mobile robots, chemical reactors, wind
tunnels, and autonomous vehicles [36]. Some extensive
researches for system (1) in presence of external dis-
turbances, actuator failures, etc., have been studied
well [37,38,39] (these are easily extended to the current
framework and thus no longer considered here). Par-
ticularly, the works in [40,41] investigated the adaptive
leader-following consensus control of system (1). In this
Fig. 1. Secure DOC architecture of the jth subsystem of CPS
affected by cyber attacks.
paper, the problem of DOC further minimizes a given
team performance function on the basis of consensus.
Remark 2. In general, the fault detector D is designed
for given failure types and cannot guarantee the de-
tectability for arbitrary malicious behaviors in theory.
Due to adversary’s strategic design, here we can assume
that the attack signal a(j)(t) in system (1) denotes a
strategic attack model which can potentially bypass the
fault detectorD to destroy the system convergence based
on the knowledge of system and detectorD (see stealthy
attack design methods against various fault detectors,
e.g., [32,33,34,35] and references therein).
The overall DOC architecture of the considered CPS
is illustrated in Fig. 1. Similar CPS architectures can
also be found in [31,26]. The cyber part C(j) consists of
a decision-making multi-agent network. Each decision-
making agent, denoted by D(j), is responsible for send-
ing the control command ℑ(j) to Σ(j). The agent D(j)
contains an optimization module and a monitoring mod-
ule, denoted by O(j) and M(j), respectively. The mod-
ule O(j) is used to optimize its local objective function,
while exchanging its information with its neighbors un-
der a network topology G. Since the adversarial attackers
can perform the attack a(j)(t) to corrupt the communi-
cation y(j)(t) from physical stratum to cyber stratum,
a cyber attack in the subsystem (P(j), C(j)) can also be
propagated to neighbors via the information exchange
between the agent D(j) and its neighboring agents. This
complicates the identification of attacked subsystems.
To address it, each module M(j) is used to detect and
isolate the cyber attack a(j). In the physical part P(j),
the control moduleK(j) consisting of an inner-loop stabi-
lizing module K(I,j) and an outer-loop tracking module
K(O,j) drives the physical dynamics in accordance with
the control command ℑ(j) coming from the decision-
making agent D(j). Fig. 1 illustrates that sufficient in-
teraction between cyber and physical parts in the CPS
architecture.
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Objective of this paper: Design the decision-making
agent D(j) (including the optimization module O(j) and
themonitoringmoduleM(j)) and the control agentK(j),
such that
1) Optimality: Under the healthy (attack-free) condi-
tion, all the physical subsystems cooperatively reach the
optimal output that minimizes the following team per-
formance function:
min
N∑
j=1
g(j)(s), s ∈ Rm (2)
where g(j) : Rm → R is a local performance function
privately known to the agentD(j); and all the closed-loop
signals of the physical system are uniformly ultimately
bounded (UUB).
2) Security: Detect and isolate multiple cyber attacks
occurring at the network communication between physi-
cal stratum and cyber superstratum, and guarantee that
the attacked subsystem P(j), j ∈ Na converges to a
given secure state y
(j)
s , while the healthy subsystems
achieve the output consensus at the optimal solution of
min
∑
j∈Nh
g(j)(s), s ∈ Rm (3)
whereNh represents the index set of the healthy subsys-
tems, i.e., Nh = {j ∈ {1, · · · , N} : a(j)(t) = 0, ∀t ≥ 0},
and Na = {1, · · · , N}\Nh.
Here we consider the scenario that the communication
from physical stratum to cyber superstratum can be at-
tacked, while the communication from the cyber super-
stratum to the physical stratum is secure [35]. For ex-
ample, for the GPS spoofing attacks on multiple Un-
manned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) [45], the GPS attacker
in fact can tamper with the location information trans-
mitted from the UAV to the ground station, but cannot
tamper with the control command from the ground sta-
tion to the UAV or other communications among the
ground stations. Indeed, in many practical situations,
the adversarial attackers may also tamper with the con-
trol commandℑ(j) transmitted from cyber superstratum
to physical stratum or communication among decision-
making agents in the cyber superstratum; however, the
design of the attack diagnosis and attack-tolerant strat-
egy is beyond the scope of this paper.
Assumption 1. The function g(j) is differentiable and
convex for all j = 1, · · · , N .
Assumption 2. The graph G of the network is undi-
rected and connected.
Remark 3. Assumptions 1 and 2 are common in the
DO or DOC literature [8,12,13,14,15,16,17,21]. In fact,
many practical optimization problems can be formalized
by the current convex DOC problem or approximated
by it using convex relaxation, such as the motion co-
ordination [14], target aggregation [12], search of radio
sources [12], optimal power flow [10], and so on. The
DOC problems for pure-integrator dynamics [13,14,15],
Euler-Lagrangian systems [12] and linear time-invariant
systems [16,17] have been studied well. This paper fur-
ther considersmore complex nonlinear case (system (1)).
Note that a simple combination of traditional DO al-
gorithms [4,5,6,7,8] and adaptive backstepping controls
[36,37,38,39] will cause the mismatch between (cyber)
optimization dynamics and physical dynamics and re-
sultantly cannot guarantee the overall convergence.
Let y
(j)
r denote the estimate of agentD(j) about the value
of the solution to (3) and denote yr = vec(y
1
r , · · · , yNr )
and L = L ⊗ Im. Then problem (3) is equivalent to
min g(yr) =
N∑
j=1
g(j)(y(j)r ), subject to Lyr = 0 (4)
Since g(yr) is convex and the constraint in (4) is linear,
the constrained optimization problem is feasible. The
following lemma gives the analysis on the optimal solu-
tion of (4).
Lemma 1 [8]. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, define by
G(y, v) = g(y) + yTLv +
1
2
yTLy.
Then G is differentiable and convex in its first argument
and linear in its second, and:
(i) if (y∗, v∗) is a saddle point of G, then y∗ is a solution
of (4);
(ii) if y∗ is a solution of (4), then there exists v∗ with
Lv∗ = −∇g(y∗) such that (y∗, v∗) is a saddle point of G.
In what follows, we present the resilient DOC scheme by
three steps. First, under the healthy conditions, we pro-
vide a basic version of DOC protocol (Section 4); Second,
under the adversarial conditions, an ADI methodology
is proposed to identify the attacked subsystems (Section
5); Third, the final secure DOC scheme is derived by for-
mulating appropriate ADI-based attack countermeasure
strategy for the basic version (Section 6).
Remark 4. In the cyber superstratum, all the decision-
making agents D(j) themselves are assumed to be
healthy in the sense that they will follow any algorithm
that we prescribe. However, due to the occurrence of
cyber attack a(j), the agent D(j) and its neighbors will
receive false measurements y(j) and thus be induced
as “malicious” agents in network topology. Moreover,
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these agents also send false data to other healthy agents
and cause cascading failures [19]. These tamped mea-
surements allow the corrupted agents to update their
states to arbitrary values such that the corresponding
physical subsystems follow false decision commands. In
this paper, a resilient DOC algorithm will be developed,
where the corresponding secure countermeasure based
on an ADI method can effectively avoid the occurrences
of “malicious agents” and cascading failures.
4 Basic DOC under healthy environment
This section deals with the designs of the optimization
module O(j) and control agent K(j) that form a basic
DOC scheme under healthy conditions, i.e., a(j)(t) = 0
for any t ≥ 0 and j ∈ {1, · · · , N}. In the sequel, we drop
the time argument of the signals for notational brevity.
4.1 DOC control algorithm
The model of the optimization module O(j) is designed
as the following algorithm
O(j) :


y˙(j)r =−∇g(j)(y(j)r )− v˜Nj
− (1 + η)
∑
i∈Nj
wji(y
(j) − y(i))
v˙(j) =
∑
i∈Nj
wji(y
(j) − y(i))
ℑ(j) =(y(j)r ,∇g(j)(y(j)r ), v˜Nj )
(5)
where v˜Nj =
∑
i∈Nj
wji(v
(j) − v(i)) ∈ Rm, and y(j)r ∈
Rm and v(j) ∈ Rm represent the agent state vectors;
∇g(j) is the gradient of g(j) and η > 0 is a design pa-
rameter, and ℑ(j) ∈ Rm × Rm × Rm is the output that
serves as a control command transmitted to the phys-
ical subsystem P(j).
Next, we present the design of control agent K(j) which
consists of inner-loopmoduleK(I,j) and outer-loopmod-
ule K(O,j) following the control command ℑ(j). First, we
define the following changes of coordinates
z
(j)
1 = x
(j)
1 − y(j)r , zi = x(j)i − α(j)i−1, i = 2, · · · , n (6)
where α
(j)
i = α
(j)
i,I + α
(j)
i,O is the virtual control function
determined at the ith step and spitted into two parts:
inner-loop control α
(j)
i,I and outer-loop control α
(j)
i,O. Sim-
ilarly, u(j) = u
(j)
I +u
(j)
O is the control input consisting of
inner-loop control u
(j)
I and outer-loop control u
(j)
O . They
can be respectively expressed as follows:
• Inner-loop control K(I,j)(x(j),ℑ(j))
α
(j)
1,I = −c(j)1 z(j)1 − ρˆ(j)z(j)1 − ω(j)1 λˆ(j) + pˆi(j) − S
(
z
(j)
1
δ(j)
)
α
(j)
i,I = −z(j)i − c(j)i z(j)i − ω(j)i λˆ(j) + Λ(j)i (7)
u
(j)
I = β
−1
j
[
−z(j)n − c(j)n z(j)n − ω(j)n λˆ(j) + Λ(j)n
]
(8)
The corresponding update laws are given as
˙ˆ
λ(j) = Γ(j)τ (j)n (9)
ρ˙(j) = γ
(j)
0 ‖z(j)1 ‖2 (10)
p˙i(j) = γ
(j)
1 z
(j)
1 (11)
where
τ
(j)
1 = ω
(j)
1 z
(j)
1 , τ
(j)
i = τ
(j)
i−1 + ω
(j)
i z
(j)
i
ω
(j)
i = ψ
(j)
i −
i−1∑
k=1
∂α
(j)
i−2,I
∂x
(j)
k
ψ
(j)
k
Λ
(j)
i =
i−1∑
k=1
∂α
(j)
i−1,I
∂x
(j)
k
x
(j)
k+1 +
∂α
(j)
i−1,I
∂λˆ(j)
Γ(j)τ
(j)
i
+
i−1∑
k=2
∂α
(j)
k−1,I
∂λˆ(j)
Γ(j)w
(j)
i z
(j)
k +
∂α
(j)
i−1,I
∂pˆi(j)
˙ˆpi(j)
S
(
z
(j)
1
δ(j)
)
=
1
2
ln
(
1 +
z
(j)
1
δ(j)
)
− 1
2
ln
(
1− z
(j)
1
δ(j)
)
with δ(j)(t) being an exponentially decaying function
with lower bound k
(j)
b such that |z(j)1,s(0)| < δ(j)(0), and
z
(j)
1,s denotes the sth (s = 1, · · · ,m) element of z(j)1 ;
ψ
(j)
1 = diag{ϕ(j)1 (x(j)1 ), 0}, ψ(j)i = diag{ϕ(j)i (x¯(j)i ), z(j)i }
for i = 2, · · · , N ; and λˆ(j), ρˆ(j) and pˆi(j) are the estimates
of λ(j) =: [θTj , µ]
T with µ =: ((1 + η)2‖L‖+ ‖L‖3)Π2/2,
ρ(j) := (2n− 1 + η)‖L‖ and pi(j) =:∑i∈Nj (v(j)∗ − v(i)∗ ),
respectively, where Π is defined in the appendix; Γ(j)
is a positive definite matrix and γ
(j)
0 , γ
(j)
1 and c
(j)
i for
i = 1, · · · , n are positive constants, all chosen by users.
Here the nonlinear function S(·) is introduced to con-
strain the bound of tracking error z
(j)
1 , motivated by the
prescribed performance technique [39], which will play
an important role in enhancing the sensitivity and ro-
bustness of the ADI scheme (refer to Remark 7).
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• Outer-loop control K(O,j)(ℑ(j))
α
(j)
1,O =−∇g(j)(y(j)r )− 2v˜Nj (12)
α
(j)
i,O =−
∂α
(j)
i−1,O
∂y
(j)
r
[
∇g(j)(y(j)r ) + v˜Nj
]
(13)
u
(j)
O =− β−1j
∂α
(j)
n−1,O
∂y
(j)
r
[
∇g(j)(y(j)r ) + v˜Nj
]
(14)
It can be seen that, the DOC structure consists of two-
layer dynamics: the optimization dynamics O(j) and the
physical dynamics (Σ(j),K(j)) which interact with each
other over the communication signals y(j) and ℑ(j) (see
Fig. 1). Such an architecture also illustrates the CPS’s
feature that the cyber and physical worlds are inte-
grated. In the inner-loop K(I,j), a traditional adaptive
backstepping controller [36] (i.e., let ‖L‖ = 0) with slight
modifications is applied to stabilize the nonlinear strict-
feedback system; In the outer-loop K(O,j), a tracking
controller is constructed in order to guarantee that the
system output can well track the control command y
(j)
r
coming from the cyber superstratum. It can be seen that
the control laws of the physical systems do not change
with the change of the control commands. Summarizing
the above procedure (5)-(14), we derive Algorithm 1 for
the DOC of the overall CPS under healthy environment.
4.2 Convergence analysis
In the section, we discuss the convergence of the pro-
posed DOC algorithm. The main result is stated in the
following theorem whose proof is placed in Appendix I.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the closed-
loop CPS (P(j), C(j)) with (K(j),O(j)), j = 1, · · · , N
achieves output consensus at an optimal solution y⋆ of
problem (2), i.e., limt→∞ y
(j)(t) = y⋆ and all the closed-
loop signals are UUB in the absence of cyber attacks if
η > 2(n− 1).
Remark 5.Differing from the previousworks [12,13,14,15,16,17]
where the integrated closed-loop control laws are de-
signed, this paper presents a new two-layer control struc-
ture based on the traditional DO algorithms [4,5,6,7,8]
and adaptive backstepping controls [36,37,38,39]. Note
that the main challenge focuses on how to eliminate the
dynamics mismatch between two layers and generate
provable optimal consensus. From the proof of Theorem
1 (see (50), (55) and (60)), the dynamics compensation
between cyber dynamics O(j) and physical dynamics
(Σ(j),K(j)) guarantees the convergence of the overall
CPS, where the adaptive mechanism (9)–(11) plays a
key role.
Algorithm 1: DOC under healthy environment
DO algorithm (Module O(y)):
y˙r =−∇g(yr)− Lv − (1 + η)Ly
v˙ =Ly
ℑ =(yr,∇g(yr), v˜)
(15)
where ∇g(yr) = vec(∇g
(1)(y
(1)
r ), · · · ,∇g
(N)(y
(N)
r )) and v˜ =
vec(v˜N1 , · · · , v˜NN ).
Adaptive tracking control (Module K(x,ℑ)):
Inner-loop control KI(x,ℑ):
α1,I =−C1z1 − ρˆz1 − ω1λˆ+ πˆ − S
(z1
δ
)
(16)
αi,I =− zi − Cizi − ωiλˆ+
i−1∑
k=1
∂αi−1
∂xk
xk+1
+
∂αi−1
∂λˆ
Γτi +
n−1∑
k=2
∂αk−1
∂λˆ
Γwizk +
∂αi−1
∂πˆ
˙ˆπ (17)
uI =B
−1
[
−zn − Cnzn − ωnλˆ+
n−1∑
k=1
∂αn−1
∂xk
xk+1
+
∂αn−1
∂λˆ
Γτn +
n−1∑
k=2
∂αk−1
∂λˆ
Γwizk +
∂αn−1
∂πˆ
˙ˆπ
]
(18)
where Ci = diag{c
(1)
i , · · · , c
(N)
i }, ρˆ = diag{ρˆ
(1), · · · , ρˆ(N)},
Γ = diag{Γ(1), · · · ,Γ(N)},B = diag{β1, · · · , βN}, S(z1/δ) =
[S(z
(1)
1 /δ
(1)), · · · , S(z
(N)
1 /δ
(N))], ψi = diag{ψ
(1)
i , · · · , ψ
(N)
i },
ωi = diag{ω
(1)
i , · · · , ω
(N)
i } and
τ1 = ω1z1
τi = τi−1 + ωizi
ωi = ψi −
i−1∑
k=1
∂αi−2
∂xk
ψk
Outer-loop control KO(ℑ):
α1,O =−∇g(yr)− 2Lv (19)
αi,O =−
∂αi−1,O
∂yr
[∇g(yr) + Lv] (20)
uO =−B
−1 ∂αn−1,O
∂yr
[∇g(yr) + Lv] (21)
where i = 2, · · · , n− 1 and Γ0 = diag{γ
(1)
0 , · · · , γ
(N)
0 }.
Update laws:
λ˙ = Γτn (22)
ρ˙ = Γ0z1 ◦ z1 (23)
π˙ = Γ1z1 (24)
where Γ0 = diag{γ
(1)
0 , · · · , γ
(N)
0 } and Γ1 = diag{γ
(1)
1 , · · · ,
γ
(N)
1 }.
6
5 Distributed ADI
This section deals with the design of the monitoring
module M(j), j ∈ {1, · · · , N}. The ADI structure fol-
lows the standard one of fault detection and isolation
(FDI), formulated by the ARRs of residuals and detec-
tion thresholds, e.g., [26,25]. However, in this section we
will focus on achieving the detection and isolation for
arbitrarymalicious behaviors by constructing new resid-
uals and thresholds. Also, due to the coupling effects of
multiple propagated attacks on the physical dynamics
and optimization dynamics, the design of attack diag-
nosis becomes more challenging.
Before giving the main result of this section, we make
the following assumption.
Assumption 3. The unknown parameter vector Z :=
vec(y∗, v∗, θ, ‖L‖) lies in a known bounded convex set
ΥZ = {Z ∈ RN(2m+p)+1 : σ(Z) ≤ 0}
where σ(Z) is a convex function.
Assumption 3 is common in the existing results for
fault diagnosis [25,26,37], and this is also necessary to
detect the attack in transient response phase. It im-
plies that the upper bounds of y∗, v∗, θ and ‖L‖, say,
yM , vM , θM , LM , can be obtained, respectively. Noting
that V (0) depends on the unknown vector Z, then we
define function Ω(Z) := V (0) and Ω¯ := supZ∈ΥZ Ω(Z),
where V is the Lyapunov function defined in proof of
Theorem 1.
5.1 Design of ADI methodology
The ADI methodology consists of detection filter, adap-
tive threshold and decision logic. Next, we will give de-
tailed design procedures.
5.1.1 Detection filter and residual generation
Now, we design a distributed filter to generate residuals
for detecting attacks. According to the dynamics struc-
ture (5) ofO(j), the monitoring moduleM(j) is designed
as
M(j) :


˙ˆy(j)r =−∇g(j)(yˆ(j)r )− v˜Nj
− (1 + η)
∑
i∈Nj
wji(yˆ
(j)
r − y(i))
˙ˆv(j) =
∑
i∈Nj
wji[(yˆ
(j)
r − y(i))− (v(j) − vˆ(j))]
(25)
where yˆ
(j)
r ∈ Rm and vˆ(j) ∈ Rm are the estimates of y(j)r
and v(j) (even y
(j)
r and v(j) are available for M(j)), re-
spectively, based on the local communication signals y(i)
and v(i), i ∈ {j} ∪Nj . Further, we define two residuals
e(j)r = y
(j)
r − yˆ(j)r (26)
e(j)v = v
(j) − vˆ(j) (27)
Taking (5) and (25) into account, the error dynamics can
be expressed as
e˙(j)r =− [∇g(j)(y(j)r )−∇g(j)(yˆ(j)r )]
− η(j)(e(j)r + z(j)1 )− η(j)a(j) (28)
e˙(j)v =− wNj (e(j)v − e(j)r − z(j)1 ) + wNja(j) (29)
where wNj =
∑
i∈Nj
wji and η
(j) = (1 + η)wNj .
It is noted that the error dynamics (28)–(29) has a de-
centralized form where only own information is used in
each error dynamics. The feature means that the cou-
pling effects of the propagated attacks a(i), i ∈ Nj on
the residuals e
(j)
r and e
(j)
v caused by the optimization
dynamics have been removed such that the locally oc-
curring attack a(j) can be isolated. Later, we will further
address the coupling effects of the propagated attacks
on the residuals caused by the physical dynamics z
(j)
1 .
Moreover, to enhance the attack detectability and re-
move the existence of stealthy attacks, double coupling
residuals have been used here.
If the sensor transmitted information y(j) is not affected
by local attack a(j), the error dynamics under healthy
conditions, denoted by (e
(j)
r,H , e
(j)
v,H), can be expressed by
e˙
(j)
r,H =− [∇g(j)(y(j)r )−∇g(j)(yˆ(j)r )]
− η(j)(e(j)r,H + z(j)1 ) (30)
e˙
(j)
v,H =− wNj (e(j)v,H − e(j)r,H − z(j)1 ) (31)
The stability of the estimation error dynamics under
healthy conditions is analyzed in the following lemma
whose proof is placed in Appendix II.
Lemma 2. The residuals under the healthy conditions
e
(j)
r,H(t) and e
(j)
v,H(t) satisfy
‖e(j)r,H(t)‖ ≤e−η
(j)te
(j)
r,H(0) + Ψ(η
(j), z
(j)
1 (t), 0, t) (32)
‖e(j)v,H(t)‖ ≤e−wNj te(j)v,H(0)
+ Ψ(wNj , e
(j)
r,H(t) + z
(j)
1 (t), 0, t) (33)
where Ψ(a, h(t), t0, t) := a
∫ t
τ=t0
ea(τ−t)‖h(τ)‖dτ .
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5.1.2 Construction of adaptive thresholds
The jth detection thresholds, denoted by e¯
(j)
r,H(t) and
e¯
(j)
v,H(t), are designed based on the bounds of residuals
e
(j)
r (t) and e
(j)
v (t) under the healthy conditions, respec-
tively. It is noted that the right-hand sides of (32) and
(33) cannot be directly used as the thresholds because
z
(j)
1 = x
(j)
1 − y(j)r (6= z˜(j)1 ) is unavailable for the mod-
ules O(j) andM(j) due to the existence of cyber attack
a(j). To derive an available and reasonable threshold, a
heuristic idea is to give a robust design w.r.t. the un-
known “disturbance-like” term z
(j)
1 which, intrinsically,
reflects the effects of physical dynamics on the residuals.
Hence, we bound the jth tracking error z
(j)
1 under the
healthy conditions in the following lemma whose proof
is placed in Appendix III.
Lemma 3. Under Assumption 3, the servo tracking er-
ror z
(j)
1 under healthy conditions (i.e., a
(j) = 0) satis-
fies ‖z(j)1 (t)‖2/(2c(j)1 ) +
∫ t
τ=0 ‖z
(j)
1 (τ)‖2dτ ≤ Ω¯/c(j)1 and
‖z(j)1 (t)‖ <
√
mδ(j)(t).
Remark 6.An intuitive method for the ADI designmay
assess the change of error signal z˜
(j)
1 := y
(j)− y(j)r based
on Lemma 3, because z˜
(j)
1 = z
(j)
1 under the healthy con-
ditions and z˜
(j)
1 = z
(j)
1 + a
(j) under cyber attacks. How-
ever, we emphasize that the error z˜
(j)
1 cannot be directly
used as the residual to detect and isolate the cyber at-
tacks because y
(j)
r may be simultaneously affected by
multiple propagated attacks a(i), i ∈ Nj and the locally
occurring attack a(j). The adversarial attacker may co-
operatively design the stealthy attacks to degrade the
system performance while avoiding detection [32,33,34].
Next, we design the detection threshold based on the
bound of z
(j)
1 (t) under the healthy condition. To be
specific, from Lemma 3, one has z
(j)
1 (t) ∈ ∆δ
(j)
z where
∆δ
(j)
z := {z(t) ∈ Cnm : 12c(j)1 ‖z(t)‖
2 +
∫ t
τ=0
‖z(τ)‖2dτ ≤
Ω¯
c
(j)
1
, ‖z(t)‖ ≤ √mδ(j)(t)}. Substituting the relation into
(32) and (33) yields that
‖e(j)r,H(t)‖ ≤e−η
(j)te
(j)
r,H(0)
+ sup
z
(j)
1 (t)∈∆
δ(j)
z
Ψ(η(j), z
(j)
1 (t), 0, t)
‖e(j)v,H(t)‖ ≤e−wNj te(j)v,H(0)
+ sup
z
(j)
1 (t)∈∆
δ(j)
z
Ψ(wNj , e
(j)
r,H(t) + z
(j)
1 (t), 0, t)
Thus, we define the two adaptive thresholds
e¯
(j)
r,H(t) = e
−η(j)te
(j)
r,H(0) + Ψ¯
(j)
∆δ
(j)
z
(η(j), 0, t)
e¯
(j)
v,H(t) = e
−wNj te
(j)
v,H(0) + Ψ¯
(j)
∆δ
(j)
ez
(wNj , 0, t)
where ∆δ
(j)
ez := {e + z : ‖e‖ ≤ e¯(j)r,H , z ∈ ∆δ
(j)
z } and
Ψ¯
(j)
∆δ
(j) (a, t0, t) := suph(t)∈∆δ(j) a
∫ t
τ=t0
ea(τ−t)‖h(τ)‖dτ .
Remark 7. From (28) and (29), multiple propagated
attacks have coupling effects on residuals e
(j)
r and e
(j)
v
over the physical dynamics. To address it, in the inner-
loop control module K(I,j) the modified prescribed per-
formance technique is used to restrict the bound of track-
ing error z
(j)
1 (introduce the nonlinear function S into
α
(j)
1,I). As a result, the detection thresholds, or further
the proposed ADI method, are robust against the mul-
tiple propagated attacks. Especially, the prescribed per-
formance bound constraint ‖z(j)1 (t)‖ <
√
mδ(j)(t) is in-
corporated and contributes to smaller thresholds (from
the definition of Ψ¯
(j)
∆δ
(j)
z
(a, t0, t)) and restrain the cou-
pling effects of propagated attacks a(i), i ∈ Nj on e(j)r
and e
(j)
v such that the sensitivity and isolability to the
cyber attacks are improved.
5.1.3 Decentralized ADI decision logic
The ADI decision logic implemented in each module
M(j) is based on the ARR, denoted by ℧(j)(t), which is
defined as
℧
(j)(t) = ℧(j,r)(t) ∪ ℧(j,v)(t) (34)
where
℧
(j,r)(t) : ‖e(j)r,H(t)‖ ≤ e¯(j)r,H(t)
℧
(j,v)(t) : ‖e(j)v,H(t)‖ ≤ e¯(j)v,H(t).
If ℧(j)(t) is violated,M(j) will generate an alarm.
The decentralized ADI decision logic is formulated by
considering the sensitivity w.r.t local cyber attacks a(j)
and the isolability w.r.t propagated cyber attacks a(i),
i ∈ Nj, which are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Consider the ARR ℧(j)(t) defined in (34).
The following statements are satisfied:
a) Attack sensitivity: If there is a time instant T
(j)
d
when ℧(j)(T
(j)
d ) is not satisfied, then the occurrence
of the local cyber attack a(j) is guaranteed.
b) Attack isolability: If the transmitted sensor infor-
mation y(j) is not affected by cyber attack a(j), then
the ARR ℧(j)(t) is always satisfied even in the pres-
ence of the propagated cyber attacks a(i), i ∈ Nj .
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Proof. a) For sake of contradiction, we suppose that no
communication attack a(j) has occurred, then ℧(j)(t) is
always satisfied according to Lemma 2.
b) Under the condition that a(j) = 0, even though the
propagated cyber attack a(i) may exist, i ∈ Nj, the es-
timation error dynamics (28)-(29) reduces to (30)-(31),
respectively. Then (32) and (33) are valid and, conse-
quently, ℧(j)(t) is always satisfied. 
Compared with the existing FDI results [24,25,26], we
have introduced the following techniques to improve the
detectability and isolability for attacks:
• Double coupling residuals are adopted, which will play
a key role in removing stealthy attacks (see Lemma 6).
• The modified prescribed performance technique is ap-
plied to enhance the sensitivity and isolability to the
cyber attacks (See Remark 7).
5.2 Detectability analysis and avoidance of stealthy at-
tacks
In this section, we will evaluate the attack detectability
of the proposed ADI methodology. We first give some
properties of functions Ψ¯
(j)
∆
(j)
z
(a, t0, t) and Ψ¯
(j)
∆
(j)
ez
(a, t0, t)
in the adaptive thresholds, which are important for ana-
lyzing the detectability performance of the ADI method-
ology.
Lemma 4. Let δ(j)(t) = (k
(j)
0 e
−c(j)t+ k
(j)
b )/
√
m, where
k
(j)
0 , k
(j)
b and c
(j)(6= a) are positive design parameters
such that |z(j)1,s(0)| < δ(j)(0), s = 1, · · · ,m. Then
(a) Ψ¯
(j)
∆δ
(j)
z
(a, 0, t) ≤ k(j)b (1−e−at)+
ak
(j)
0
a−c(j)
(e−c
(j)t−e−at);
(b) Ψ¯
(j)
∆δ
(j)
ez
(a, 0, t) ≤ 2k(j)b (1−e−at)+
(2a−c(j))ak
(j)
0
(a−c(j))2
(e−c
(j)t−
e−at) + a
[
k
(j)
b +
ak
(j)
0
a−c(j)
+ e
(j)
r,H(0)
]
te−at;
(c)
∫∞
t=0
Ψ¯
(j)2
∆δ
(j)
z
(a, 0, t)dt ≤ Ω¯/c(j)1 ,
∫∞
t=0
Ψ¯
(j)2
∆δ
(j)
ez
(a, 0, t)dt ≤
2Ω¯/c
(j)
1 .
Proof. (a) Note that Ψ(j)(a, h(t), 0, t) increases as
‖h(t)‖ increases. Based on the constraint ‖h(t)‖ ≤
k
(j)
0 e
−c(j)t + k
(j)
b , we have
Ψ¯
(j)
∆δ
(j)
z
(a, 0, t) ≤ a
∫ t
τ=0
ea(τ−t)(k
(j)
0 e
−c(j)t + k
(j)
b )dτ
By direct computation, the inequality in (a) holds.
(b) Based on (a) and using similar analysis, the proof
can be completed.
(c) Let h∗(t) := arg sup
h(t)∈∆δ
(j)
z
a
∫ t
τ=0
ea(τ−t)‖h(τ)‖dτ ,
i.e., Ψ¯
(j)
∆δ
(j)
z
(a, t0, t) = a
∫ t
τ=0
ea(τ−t)‖h∗(τ)‖dτ . Since
∆δ
(j)
z is a compact set, h
∗(t) satisfies
∫∞
τ=0 ‖h∗(τ)‖2dτ ≤
Ω¯/c
(j)
1 .
To show (c), we construct the auxiliary dynamics
χ˙(t) = −aχ(t) + a‖h∗(t)‖, χ(0) = 0 (35)
By integrating the dynamics we can find χ(t) =
Ψ¯
(j)
∆δ
(j)
z
(a, t0, t). On the other hand, considering the Lya-
punov function V = χ2/2, its derivative along with (35)
satisfies
V˙ =χ(−aχ+ a‖h∗‖)
≤− aV + a
2
‖h∗‖2,
integrating two sides of which yields
∫∞
t=0 χ
2(t)dt ≤
Ω¯/c
(j)
1 . Using similar procedure to Ψ¯
(j)
∆δ
(j)
ez
(a, 0, t), it is
easily obtained that
∫∞
t=0
Ψ¯
(j)2
∆δ
(j)
ez
(a, 0, t)dt ≤ 2Ω¯/c(j)1 . 
From Lemma 4-(c), one has limt→∞ Ψ¯
(j)
∆δ
(j)
z
(a, 0, t) =
0 and limt→∞ Ψ¯
(j)
∆δ
(j)
ez
(a, 0, t) = 0 following Barbalat’s
Lemma. It means that only if ℧(j)(t) is satisfied, the
bound functions e¯
(j)
r,H(t) and e¯
(j)
v,H(t) will converge to
zero, which in turn implies that e
(j)
r (t) and e
(j)
v (t) con-
verge to zero. Lemma 4-(a) and -(b) give prescribed
performance bounds of Ψ¯
(j)
∆δ
(j)
z
and Ψ¯
(j)
∆δ
(j)
ez
. By replac-
ing Ψ¯
(j)
∆δ
(j)
z
and Ψ¯
(j)
∆δ
(j)
ez
with the prescribed performance
bounds, we can obtain low-complexity thresholds. How-
ever, such relaxations will weaken the detectability and
extend the detection time. Also, two modified thresh-
olds converge to k
(j)
b and 2k
(j)
b instead of zero, which
may generate the stealthy attacks. Nevertheless, we can
choose k
(j)
b to be sufficiently small such that the effects
of the stealthy attacks resulted from the relaxation are
sufficiently small.
To examine the sensitivity of attacks that can be de-
tectable by the proposed attack detection scheme, the
following attack detectability is analyzed.
Lemma 5 (Detectable attacks). The cyber attack
a(j) occurring at the CPS (P(j), C(j)) is detected us-
ing the ARR ℧(j), if there exists some time instant
T
(j)
d > T
(j)
a (T
(j)
a is the first time instant of attack a(j)
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occurrence) such that the attack satisfies
η(j)
∥∥∥∥∥
∫ T (j)
d
t=T
(j)
a
eη
(j)(t−T
(j)
d
)a(j)(t)dt
∥∥∥∥∥ >
2eη
(j)(T (j)a −T
(j)
d
)‖e(j)r (T (j)a )‖ + Ψ¯(j)∆δ(j)z (η
(j), T (j)a , T
(j)
d )
+ η(j)
∫ T (j)
d
t=T
(j)
a
eη
(j)(t−T
(j)
d
)
∥∥∥∇g(j)(y(j)r (t))
−∇g(j)(yˆ(j)r (t)) + η(j)z(j)1 (t)
∥∥∥ dt (36)
or
wNj
∥∥∥∥∥
∫ T (j)
d
t=T
(j)
a
ewNj (t−T
(j)
d
)a(j)(t)dt
∥∥∥∥∥
>2ewNj (T
(j)
a −T
(j)
d
)‖e(j)v (T (j)a )‖+ Ψ¯(j)∆δ(j)ez (wNj , T
(j)
a , T
(j)
d )
+ wNj
∫ T (j)
d
t=T
(j)
a
ewNj (t−T
(j)
d
)
∥∥∥e(j)r (t) + z(j)1 (t)∥∥∥ dt (37)
then the attack a(j)(t) is detected at the time t = T
(j)
d .
Proof. After the first occurrence of the attack a(j), i.e.,
t > T
(j)
a , the time derivative of e
(j)
r (t) becomes
e˙(j)r =− [∇g(j)(y(j)r )−∇g(j)(yˆ(j)r )]
− η(j)(e(j)r + z(j)1 ) + η(j)a(j)
Integrating both sides and applying the triangular in-
equality yield
‖e(j)r (T (j)d )‖ ≥η(j)
∥∥∥∥∥
∫ T (j)
d
t=Tf
eη
(j)(t−T
(j)
d
)a(j)(t)dt
∥∥∥∥∥
− eη(j)(T (j)a −T (j)d )‖e(j)r (T (j)a )‖
− η(j)
∫ T (j)
d
t=T
(j)
a
eη
(j)(t−T
(j)
d
)
∥∥∥∇g(j)(y(j)r (t))
−∇g(j)(yˆ(j)r (t)) + η(j)z(j)1 (t)
∥∥∥ dt,
substituting (36) into which yields
‖e(j)r (T (j)d )‖ >eη
(j)(T (j)a −T
(j)
d
)e(j)r (T
(j)
a )
+ Ψ¯
(j)
∆δ
(j)
z
(η(j), T (j)a , t).
Following the similar analysis, (37) guarantees
‖e(j)v (T (j)d )‖ >ewNj (T
(j)
a −T
(j)
d
)e(j)v (T
(j)
a )
+ Ψ¯
(j)
∆δ
(j)
ez
(wNj , T
(j)
a , t).
From the definition of ℧(j)(t), the attack a(j)(t) satisfy-
ing (36) or (37) provokes the violation of ARR ℧(j)(t)
and resultantly a(j)(t) is detected when t = T
(j)
d . 
The inequalities (36)-(37) characterize the class of de-
tectable cyber attacks under the worst-case detectabil-
ity. The computation of detection time T
(j)
d may be
somewhat conservative. However, differing from the
fault, the attacker may strategically design the (worst-
case) attack to extend the detection time as much as
possible. Thus, the real-time detection time may suf-
ficiently approach to T
(j)
d but not exceed than it. In
general, from (36)-(37), if the cyber attack on the time
interval [T
(j)
a , T
(j)
d ] is sufficiently large, then the attack
can be detected. However, a crafty attacker may inge-
niously inject the attack signals which are not detected
by the proposed distributed ADI scheme, yet degrade
the system performance. The following lemma 6 gives
the property of the undetectable attack.
Lemma 6 (Undetectable attacks). Suppose that the
cyber attack a(j)(t) occurring at the subsystem (P(j),
C(j)) is undetectable by the ARR ℧(j). Then
∫ ∞
t=T
(j)
a
(∫ t
τ=T
(j)
a
ewNj (τ−t)‖a(j)(τ)‖dτ
)2
dt ≤M (38)
whereM = 4‖e(j)v (T (j)a )‖2/w4Nj +16Ω¯/(c
(j)
1 w
2
Nj
). More-
over,
∫∞
t=T
(j)
a
‖a(j)(t)‖2dt < +∞.
Proof. If the attack a(j)(t) occurring at time T
(j)
a is not
detectable, from Lemma 5, then for any t ≥ T (j)a ,
wNj
∥∥∥∥
∫ t
τ=T
(j)
a
ewNj (τ−t)a(j)(τ)dτ
∥∥∥∥
≤2ewNj (T (j)a −t)‖e(j)v (T (j)a )‖+ 2Ψ¯(j)∆δ(j)ez (wNj , T
(j)
a , t)
(39)
Consider the right-hand side of (39). Taking square and
integral consecutively to each term yields
4‖e(j)v (T (j)a )‖2
∫ ∞
t=T
(j)
a
e2wNj (T
(j)
a −t)dt ≤ 2‖e
(j)
v (T
(j)
a )‖2
wNj
,
4
∫ ∞
t=T
(j)
a
Ψ¯
(j)2
∆δ
(j)
ez
(wNj , T
(j)
a , t)dt ≤
8Ω¯
c
(j)
1
.
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 4-(c).
Then using the Cauchy-Buniakowsky-Schwarz inequal-
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ity, one has
4
∫ ∞
t=T
(j)
a
(ewNj (T
(j)
a −t)‖e(j)v (T (j)a )‖
+ Ψ¯
(j)
∆δ
(j)
ez
(wNj , T
(j)
a , t))
2dt
≤ 4‖e
(j)
v (T
(j)
a )‖2
w2
Nj
+
16
c
(j)
1
Ω¯ (40)
Combining (39) and (40), Eq. (38) follows at once. Fur-
ther, limt→∞
∫ t
τ=T
(j)
a
ewNj (τ−t)a(j)(τ)dτ = 0.
Next, to prove
∫∞
t=T
(j)
a
‖a(j)(t)‖2dt < +∞, we consider
the error dynamics
e˙(j)v = −wNj (e(j)v − e(j)r − z(j)1 ) + wNja(j).
Noting that ℧(j) is always satisfied, then e
(j)
r , e
(j)
v , z
(j)
1 ∈
L2 from Lemma 4-(c). Therefore, there exist a suffi-
ciently big T ≥ T (j)a and a time interval Ξv with ν(Ξv) =
0 such that
a
(j)
s (t)
e
(j)
v,s(t)
< 1, ∀t ∈ [T,∞)\Ξv
which means that there exists a function φ¯v(t) ≤ 0 such
that
‖a(j)(t)‖< ‖e(j)v (t)‖ or a(j)(t) = φ¯v(t)sgn(e(j)v (t)) (41)
for any t ∈ [T,∞)\Ξv, where a(j)s and e(j)v,s represent the
sth element of a(j) and e
(j)
v . Applying similar procedure
to e˙
(j)
r = −[∇g(j)(y(j)r )−∇g(j)(yˆ(j)r )]−η(j)(e(j)r +z(j)1 )+
η(j)a(j), there exist φ¯r(t) ≤ 0 and Ξr with ν(Ξr) = 0
such that
‖a(j)(t)‖< ‖e(j)r (t)‖ or a(j)(t) = φ¯r(t)sgn(e(j)r (t)) (42)
for any t ∈ [T,+∞)\Ξr.
Compared (41) with (42), and noting that the equality
sgn(e(j)v (t)) = sgn(e
(j)
r (t)), ∀t ∈ [T,+∞)\(Ξr ∪ Ξv)
does not hold, it yields that ‖a(j)(t)‖ < ‖e(j)r (t)‖ or
‖a(j)(t)‖ < ‖e(j)v (t)‖ for any t ∈ [T,+∞)\(Ξr ∪ Ξv),
which guarantees
∫∞
t=T
(j)
a
‖a(j)(t)‖2dt < +∞. 
Lemma 6 implies that any undetectable attack must be-
long to L2. From its proof, we can see the design of dou-
ble coupling residuals plays a key role in removing the
existence of stealthy attacks a(j)(t) = φ¯r(t)sgn(e
(j)
r (t))
against ℧(j,r) or a(j)(t) = φ¯v(t)sgn(e
(j)
v (t)) against
℧(j,v). Now, we give the main result of this section.
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 1-3, the closed-loop
CPS (P(j), C(j)) with (K(j),D(j)(O(j), M(j))) achieves
output consensus at an optimal solution of problem (2)
and all the closed-loop signals are UUB even in the pres-
ence of the undetectable attacks if η > 2(n− 1).
Proof. From Lemma 6, one has
∫∞
t=T
(j)
a
‖a(j)(t)‖2dt <
+∞. Following Theorem 1, the proof can be complete.
Theorem 3 implies that all the subsystems (P(j), C(j)),
j = 1, · · · , N can achieve optimal consensus only if the
ARRs ℧(j) are satisfied. In other words, any attacks can-
not bypass the designed ADI methodology to destroy
the system convergence.
6 Secure countermeasure against cyber attacks
With these results on basic DOC and ADI in hand, we
now provide a secure countermeasure against the cyber
attacks and give the final secure DOC algorithm. The
security objective is to steer the physical partP(j), j ∈
NA to a secure state y
(j)
s ∈ Rm, i.e., limt→∞ y(j)(t) =
y
(j)
s , while guaranteeing (P(j), C(j)), j ∈ NH to achieve
the output consensus at the optimal solution of
min
∑
j∈NH
g(j)(s), s ∈ Rm (43)
where NA represents the set of subsystems (P(j), C(j))
which are affected by detectable attack a(j) subject to
(36) or (37), and NH , {1, · · · , N} \NA represents the
set of the subsystems which are healthy or affected by
undetectable attacks satisfying (38). To guarantee the
output consensus of subsystems P(j), j ∈ NH , the fol-
lowing assumption is necessary in accordance with As-
sumption 2.
Assumption 4. The network topology induced by
agents D(j), j ∈ NH is connected.
Assumption 4 captures the communication redundancy
of graphG. Note that different notions of network robust-
ness have been reported to guarantee the convergence of
resilient distributed algorithms, e.g., [20,21,22,23]. For
an undirected graph, Assumption 4 is in fact necessary
for achieving the security objective (43).
Before giving the secure countermeasure, we first define
a notification signal ̥(j)(t) such that “̥(j)(t) = 1” rep-
resents the jth subsystem (P(j), C(j)) is attacked at time
t, and “̥(j)(t) = 0” otherwise. In order to prevent the
transmission data y(j) corrupted by the cyber attack a(j)
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from being propagated the neighboring subsystems, we
design
̥
(j)(t) =
{
1, if t ≥ T (j)d
0, otherwise
(44)
where T
(j)
d is the attack detection time forM(j), defined
as
T
(j)
d = inf
t≥0
{
t : ℧(j)(t) is volated
}
.
If ℧(j)(t) is always satisfied, then the detection time is
defined as T
(j)
d = +∞.
According to the security objective, we modify the out-
put of decision-making dynamics (5), i.e., the control
command ℑ(j), under adversarial environment as
ℑ(j) =
{
(y(j)r ,∇g(j)(y(j)r ), v˜Nj ), if t < T (j)d
(y(j)s , 0, 0), otherwise
(45)
The final secure decision-making algorithm for
agent D(j) based on the notification signal (44) and the
control command (45) is summarized as:
• Receive (y(i), v(i),̥(i)) to its neighbors D(i), i ∈ Nj ;
• Set y(i) = 0 and v(i) = 0 if ̥(i) = 1;
• Update state by computing Eq. (5);
• Send control command ℑ(j) to control module K(j)
Theorem 4. Consider the closed-loop CPS (P(j), C(j))
with (K(j),D(j)(O(j),M(j))) in the presence of cyber at-
tacks a(j), j ∈ {1, · · · , N}. Under Assumptions 1-4, sub-
systems (P(j), C(j)), j ∈ NH achieve the output consen-
sus at the optimal solution y⋆NH of (43), while the sys-
tem output of physical part P(j), j ∈ NA converges to
a given state y
(j)
s , i.e., limt→∞ y
(j)(t) = y⋆NH for j ∈ NH
and limt→∞ y
(j)(t) = y
(j)
s for j ∈ NA. Moreover, all the
closed-loop signals are UUB.
Proof. Consider the subsystem (P(j), C(j)), j ∈ NA.
From Lemma 5, ℧(j) is not satisfied and the optimiza-
tion module O(j) sends the control command (y(j)s , 0, 0)
to the control module K(O,j). Then from (12)-(14) the
outer-loop control u
(j)
O = 0 and the inner-loop control
u
(j)
I (traditional adaptive backstepping control [36]) can
guarantee the closed-loop P(j) converges to y(j)s .
Consider the subsystem (P(j), C(j)), j ∈ NH . Given the
Fig. 2. Model of Underwater Robotics Vehicle
above secure decision-making, the dynamics (5) becomes


y˙(j)r =−∇g(j)(y(j)r )−
∑
i∈Nj∩NH
wji(v
(j) − v(i))
− (1 + η)
∑
i∈Nj∩NH
wji(y
(j) − y(i))
v˙(j) =
∑
i∈Nj∩NH
wji(y
(j) − y(i))
Following Theorem 1 and Theorem 3, the output of P(j),
j ∈ NH converges to the optimal solution of problem
(43) as t→ +∞, and all the signals are UUB. 
From (44) and (45), the security performance under the
cyber attacks heavily relies on the detection time T
(j)
d .
With the increase of (T
(j)
d −T (j)a ), the attacker will have
more time to damage the system performance.
7 Simulation example
As a practical application of the studied problem frame-
work, we apply our algorithms to the problem of mo-
tion coordination of multiple Remotely Operated Vehi-
cles (ROVs). The motion coordination expects the for-
mation of ROVs to rendezvous at a location which is
optimal for the formation [16,14]. The dynamic behav-
ior of ROVs can be described in two coordinate frames,
the body-fixed frame and the earth-fix frame as shown
in Fig. 2. The dynamics equation of each ROV can be
expressed as [44]:
η˙ =J(η)ν
M ν˙ + C(ν) +D(ν)ν + g(η) =τ +∆f
(46)
where η = [x, y, z, φ, θ, ψ]T is the position and orienta-
tion described in the earth-fixed frame (|θ| < pi/2 and
|φ| < pi/2), ν = [u, v, w, p, q, r]T is the linear and angu-
lar velocity in the body-fixed frame, M = MRB +MA
andM is positive definite, C(ν) = CRB(ν)+CA(ν) sat-
isfying C(ν) = −CT (ν), MRB is the rigid-body inertia
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matrix, MA is the added inertia matrix; CRB(ν) is the
rigid-body Coriolis and centripetal matrix, CA(ν) is the
hydrodynamic Coriolis and centripetal matrix in clud-
ing added mass,D(ν) is hydrodynamic damping and lift
matrix, g(η) is a vector of gravitational forces and mo-
ment, τ is the control force and torque vector, ∆f is the
bounded disturbance vector. Note that system (46) can
be transformed into the form of system (1) by choosing
the state variables [xT1 , x
T
2 ]
T = [ηT ,νT JT (η)]T .
As reported in [44], in the positioning and trajectory
tracking control of ROV, the variables needed to be con-
trolled are x, y, z and ψ. Under some cases, for the pur-
pose of improving the dynamic stability and decreasing
the influences of φ and θ on other variables, a simple P-
controller can be used to control φ and θ. Therefore the
order of the MIMO backstepping robust controller can
be reduced from 6 degrees of freedom (DOF) to 4 DOF.
To simplify the controller design, the transformation
matrix J(η) can also be approximately obtained by as-
suming that φ = θ = p = q = 0, then the corre-
sponding matrix parameters of reduced system areM =
diag{mν − Xu˙,mν − Yv˙,mν − Zw˙, Iz − Nr˙}, D(ν) =
−diag{Xu+Xu|u|, Yv+Yv|v|v, Zw+Zw|w|, Nr+Nr|r|r},
g(η) = [0, 0,−(W −B), 0]T and
J(η) =


cosψ − sinψ 0 0
sinψ cosψ 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

 ,
C(ν) =


0 0 0 −(mν − Yv˙)v
0 0 0 −(mν −Xu˙)u
0 0 0 0
(mν − Yv˙)v −(mν −Xu˙)u 0 0

 .
According to [44], the velocity dynamics can be ex-
pressed as linear-parametric form
M ν˙v + C(ν) +D(ν)ν + g(η) = Φ
T (ν, ν˙v,η)σ
where σ = [mν −Xu˙,mν −Yv˙, Xu, X|u|u, Yv, Y|v|v,mν −
Zw˙, Zw, Zw|w|,W − B, Iz − Nr˙, Nr, Nr|r|] is unknown
system parameter vector, νv is the virtual control and
Φ(ν, ν˙v,η) is a known reduced regressormatrix function
whose specific form can be found in [44] and is omitted
here for saving space.
Consider a ROV formation which consists of 4 same
ROVs. The parameters of the ROV are shown in Ta-
ble I. The communication topology G is given by a 2-
regular graph and the edge weightwji = 1. The problem
of multi-agent coordination consisting in finding a dis-
tributed control strategy that is able to drive each ROV
TABLE I. Simulation Model Parameters of ROV
Par Value Par Value
mν 2500kg Xu˙ -2140kg
Iz 1250kg·m
2 Yv˙ -1636kg
W 24525N Zw˙ -3000kg
B 24525N Nr˙ -1524kg·m
2
Xu -3610kg/s Xu|u| -952 kg/m
Yv -4660kg/s Yv|v| -1361kg/m
Zw -11772kg/s Zw|w| -3561kg/m
Nr -7848kg·m
2/(s·rad) Nr|r| -773kg·m
2/(s·rad)
from its initial position to rendezvous at the target posi-
tion which minimizes the square sum of distances from
these initial positions. The coordination control objec-
tive can be formulated as the following problem:
min
η(j)
4∑
j=1
‖η(j) − η(j)0 ‖2, s.t. η(1) = · · · = η(4) (47)
where η
(j)
0 represents the initial state of the jth ROV.
Next, we apply the proposed secure DOC control strat-
egy to complete the motion coordination task. Consider
the cyber attacks (also including the sensor faults or
some extraneous factors such as ocean currents) occur-
ring in the complex underwater environment. When
the cyber core detects the existence of the cyber at-
tacks, it will drive the attacked ROV to the secure state
ηs = 0. In the simulation, the initial state conditions
of these four ROVs are set as η(1)(0) = [0.3 0.4 1 0]T ,
η(2)(0) = [0.1 0.1 0.5 − pi/6]T , η(3)(0) = [0 0 0 − pi/8]T
and η(4)(0) = [0.2 0.5 1 0]T . Assume that the
4th ROV suffers the cyber attack at t = 30s, and
φ(4)(t) = e0.5(t−30)−1[sin(t) cos(t) − sin(t) − cos(t)]T .
For simplifying calculation, only the ARR ℧(j,r)(t)
rather than ℧(j)(t) is used in the proposed ADI ap-
proach.
The simulation results are shown in Figs. 3-5. Fig. 3 de-
scribes the state responses of η(j)(t) and ν(j)(t) of these
four ROVs, j = 1, · · · , 4. It can be seen that these four
ROVs are arriving at the consensus at the optimal solu-
tion of (47) before the attack occurs. The ADI mecha-
nism based on the ARR ℧(j,r)(t) formulated by e
(j)
r and
e
(j)
r,H is shown in Fig. 4, which implies that for j = 1, 2, 3,
the ARR ℧(j,r)(t) generated by M(j) is still satisfied
even after the cyber attack occurs, while ℧(4,y)(t) is im-
mediately violated (about at t = 31.5s), thus indicating
the cyber attack occurs in the 4th ROV. After detecting
the cyber attack, the module O(j) will send the control
command ℑ(j) = (ηs, 0, 0) to the 4th ROV based on the
secure decision-making (45). Then the ROV stops send-
ing the transmission data η(4), and converges to the se-
cure position ηs = 0, while the remaining three ROVs
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achieve the consensus at the optimal solution of
min
η(j)
3∑
j=1
‖η(j) − η(j)0 ‖2, s.t. η(1) = η(2) = η(3) (48)
These have been illustrated in Fig. 3. The control inputs
of the overall procedure are plotted in Fig. 5.
To further visualize the motion coordination of the ROV
formation, also for comparison, the routes of the formu-
lation of ROVs under the following three cases are pre-
sented in Figs. 7-9, respectively, where the Simulink in
MATLAB running time is set as [0s,80s]:
Case 1: Apply the basic/secure version of DOC under
attack-free environment;
Case 2: Apply the basic version of DOC (without the
ADI mechanism and secure countermeasure, i.e., set
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ℑ(j) = (y(j)r , ∇g(j)(y(j)r ), v˜Nj ) and F (j) = 0 all the
time) under adversarial environment;
Case 3: Apply the secure version of DOC under adver-
sarial environment.
In Fig. 6, clearly all the ROVs rendezvous at the tar-
get position (0.15, 0.25, 0.625) (the optimal solution of
problem (47)) under the healthy condition. Fig. 7 shows
that under the case when the 4th ROV is attacked,
all the ROVs follow the wrong control commands and
move along with wrong (insecure) routes due to the at-
tack propagation through the exchange of information
between neighboring subsystems (The Simulink reports
“ERROR” at t = 34.45s and terminates). However,
by applying the secure DOC scheme, the ROVs 1, 2
and 3 rendezvous at the target position (0.1333, 0.1678,
0.5003) (the optimal solution of problem (48)), and the
4th ROV reach the preset secure position (0, 0, 0), which
has been illustrated in Fig. 8.
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8 Conclusions
This paper presented a secure DOC method for a class
of uncertain nonlinear CPSs. First, a basic DOC under
the healthy conditions was proposed. By interacting and
coordinating between cyber dynamics and physical dy-
namics, the consensus and optimality were guaranteed.
In the presence of multiple cyber attacks, we proposed
a distributed ADI approach to identify the locally oc-
curring attacks from multiple propagating attacks. It
is shown that any attack signal cannot bypass the de-
signed ADI approach to destroy the convergence of the
DOC algorithm. Finally, a secure countermeasure strat-
egy against cyber attacks was described, which guaran-
tees that all healthy physical subsystems complete the
DOC objective, while the attacked physical subsystems
converge to a given secure state.
Appendix I
Proof of Theorem 1. First, we give the convergence
analysis on the cyber dynamics (15) and physical dy-
namics (1) based on the Lyapunov method, respectively.
Cyber dynamics: Let y∗ = 1N ⊗ y⋆ be a solution of
(4). By Lemma 1-(ii), there exists v∗ ∈ RNm such that
∇g(y∗r ) + Lv∗ + (1 + η)Ly∗r = 0 holds, and (y∗, v∗) is
the saddle of G. Consider the Lyapunov function of the
cyber dynamics
Vc =
1
2
(‖yr − y∗‖2 + ‖v − v∗‖2)
Note that z1 = y−yr under the healthy conditions. Then
(15) becomes
y˙r =−∇g(yr)− Lv − (1 + η)Lyr − (1 + η)Lz1
v˙ =Lyr + Lz1
(49)
The time derivative of Vc along with (49) is
V˙c =(yr − y∗)T [−∇g(yr)− Lv − (1 + η)Lyr]
+ (v − v∗)TLyr − (1 + η)zT1 Lyr + (v − v∗)TLz1
(a)
=(y∗ − yr)T [∇g(yr) + Lv + Lyr]− yTr Lyr
+G(yr, v)−G(yr, v∗)− (1 + η)zT1 Lyr
+ (v − v∗)TLz1
(b)
≤G(y∗, v)−G(y∗, v∗) +G(y∗, v∗)−G(y, v∗)
− ηyTr Lyr − (1 + η)zT1 Lyr + (v − v∗)TLz1
(c)
≤ − ηyTr Lyr − (1 + η)zT1 Lyr + vTLz1 − zT1 pi (50)
where the equalities: (a) follows from Ly∗ = 0 and the
linearity of G in its second argument; (b) follows from
the convexity ofG in the first argument; (c) follows from
the fact that (y∗, v∗) is the saddle point of G. Note that
the mismatching terms vTLz1 and −zT1 pi will be com-
pensated by the following physical dynamics.
Physical system: The convergence analysis is dis-
cussed based on backstepping procedure. Rewrite (1)
into a compact form
P :


x˙i = xi+1 + ϕi(x¯i)θ, i = 1, · · · , n− 1
x˙n = Bu+ ϕn(x)θ,
y = x1
(51)
where ϕi(x¯i) = diag{ϕ(1)i (x¯(1)i ), · · · , ϕ(N)i (x¯(N)i )} and
θ = vec(θ1, · · · , θN ).
The error dynamics can be expressed as


z˙1 = α1 + ϕ1(x¯1)θ − y˙r + z2
z˙i = αi + ϕi(x¯i)θ − α˙i−1 + zi+1
z˙n = Bu+ ϕn(x)θ − α˙n−1
(52)
which can be spitted into inner-loop and outer-loop sub-
systems:


z˙1,I =α1,I + ψ1(x¯1)λ+ z2
z˙i,I =αi,I + ψi(x¯i)λ− α˙i−1,I + zi+1 − µzi
z˙n,I =BuI + ψn(x)λ − α˙n−1,I − µzn
(53)
and 

z˙1,O = α1,O − y˙r
z˙i,O = αi,O − α˙i−1,O
z˙n,O = BuO − α˙n−1,O
(54)
where zi = zi,I + zi,O for i = 1, · · · , n.
Next, we provide the Lyapunov analysis of the physical
dynamics by considering
Vp =
1
2
(
n∑
i=1
‖zi‖2 + λ˜TΓ−1λ˜+ ρ˜TΓ−10 ρ˜+ p˜iTΓ−11 p˜i
)
where λ˜ = λ− λˆ, ρ˜ = ρ− ρˆ, p˜i = pi − pˆi.
The derivative of Vp can be computed as
V˙p =
n∑
i=1
ziz˙i − λ˜TΓ−1 ˙ˆλ− ρ˜TΓ−10 ˙ˆρ− p˜iTΓ−11 ˙ˆpi
=V˙I + V˙O
where V˙I =
∑n
i=1 ziz˙i,I − λ˜TΓ−1 ˙ˆλ− ρ˜TΓ−10 ˙ˆρ− p˜iTΓ−11 ˙ˆpi
and V˙O =
∑n
i=1 ziz˙i,O represent the inner-loop and
outer-loop Lyapunov derivatives, respectively.
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Consider the inner-loop error dynamics (53) with con-
trols (16)-(18) and adaptive laws (22)-(24). Following
the traditional backstepping procedure [36], along with
(53), we can obtain
V˙I ≤−
n∑
i=1
zTi Cizi − µ
n∑
i=2
‖zi‖2
− ρ‖z1‖2 + zT1 pi − zT1 S
(z1
δ
)
. (55)
Nowwe consider the outer-loop error dynamics (54) with
controls (19)-(21).
Step 1. In view of (54) and (15), we have
z˙1,O = α1,O +∇g(yr) + Lv + (1 + η)Ly (56)
To stabilize (56), consider the Lyapunov derivative
V˙1,O = z1z˙1,O. Then using the virtual control (19), we
have
V˙1,O =z
T
1 [α1,O +∇g(yr) + Lv + (1 + η)Ly]
=− zT1 Lv + (1 + η)zT1 Ly
=− zT1 Lv + (1 + η)zT1 L(yr + z1)
≤− zT1 Lv + (1 + η)zT1 Lyr + (1 + η)‖L‖‖z1‖2
(57)
Step i(2 ≤ i ≤ n). Note that the arguments of the func-
tion αi−1,O involve yr and v. From (54) and (15), we
have
z˙i,O=αi,O +
∂αi−1,O
∂yr
[∇g(yr) + Lv + (1 + η)Ly]
− ∂αi−2,O
∂yr
L2y
=
[
(1 + η)
∂αi−1,O
∂yr
L− ∂αi−2,O
∂yr
L2
]
(yr + z1) (58)
By using the triangular inequality, one has
(1 + η)zTi
∂αi−1,O
∂yr
Lyr ≤1
4
(1 + η)2‖L‖zTi
(
∂αi−1,O
∂yr
)2
zi
+ yrLyr
(1 + η)zTi
∂αi−1,O
∂yr
Lz1 ≤1
4
(1 + η)2‖L‖zTi
(
∂αi−1,O
∂yr
)2
zi
+ ‖L‖‖z1‖2
−∂αi−2,O
∂yr
L2yr ≤ 1
4
‖L‖3zTi
(
∂αi−2,O
∂yr
)2
zi + yrLyr
−∂αi−2,O
∂yr
L2z1 ≤ 1
4
‖L‖3zTi
(
∂αi−2,O
∂yr
)2
zi + ‖L‖‖z1‖2
Also, on the compact set {V (t) ≤ V (0)}, there exists
a positive constant such that ‖∂αi,O/∂yr‖ ≤ Π for all
i = 1, · · · , n − 1. Based on these facts, the Lyapunov
derivative V˙i,O = ziz˙i,O along with (58) can be expressed
as
V˙i,O =z
T
i
[
(1 + η)
∂αi−1,O
∂yr
L− ∂αi−2,O
∂yr
L2
]
(yr + z1)
≤µ‖zi‖2 + 2‖L‖‖z1‖2 + 2yTr Lyr (59)
Combining (57) and (59), the outer-loop Lyapunov
derivative satisfies
V˙O ≤ − zT1 Lv + (1 + η)zT1 Lyr + ρ‖z1‖2 + 2(n− 1)yTr Lyr
+ µ
n∑
i=2
‖zi‖2 (60)
Finally, construct the Lyapunov function V = Vc+Vp for
the overall CPS. Taking (50), (55) and (60) into account,
its time derivative satisfies
V˙ ≤− (η − 2(n− 1))yTr Lyr −
n∑
i=1
zTi Cizi
−
N∑
j=1
z
(j)T
1 S
(
z
(j)
1
δ(j)
)
≤− (η − 2(n− 1))yTr Lyr −
n∑
i=1
zTi Cizi (61)
where the fact z
(j)T
1 S(z
(j)
1 /δ
(j)) ≥ 0 is used.
Choose η > 2(n − 1). Then V˙ ≤ 0. Thus, {V (t) ≤
V (0)} is an invariant set. It implies that z(t), yr(t), v(t),
λˆ(t), ρˆ(t), pˆi(t) and z
(j)T
1 S(z
(j)
1 /δ
(j)) are bounded. Then
y(t) = z1(t)+yr(t) is bounded. Along with the backstep-
ping procedure, αi(t), ui(t) and xi(t) are also bounded.
Noting y˙r(t), v˙(t) ∈ L∞ and yTr (t)Lyr(t), zi(t) ∈ L2. Ac-
cording to Barbalat’s Lemma, limt→∞ y
T
r (t)Lyr(t) = 0
and limt→∞ zi(t) = 0. Finally, following the proof of [[8].
Theorem4.1], one obtains that limt→∞ yr(t) = y
∗. Thus,
we can conclude that limt→∞[y(t)−y∗] = limt→∞[y(t)−
yr(t) + yr(t)− y∗] = 0. 
Appendix II
Proof of Lemma 2. To analyze the stability of (30),
we first construct an auxiliary system
˙˜e
(j)
r,H = −η(j)(e˜(j)r,H + z(j)1 ), e˜(j)r,H(0) = e(j)r,H(0) (62)
By directly computing (62), we obtain that
‖e˜(j)r,H(t)‖ ≤ e−η
(j)te
(j)
r,H(0) + Ψ(η
(j), z
(j)
1 (t), 0, t).
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Also, along with (62), the time derivative of the Lya-
punov function U (j)(e˜
(j)
r,H) = ‖e˜(j)r,H‖2/2 is
U˙ (j)(e˜
(j)
r,H) =− η(j)e˜(j)Tr,H (e˜(j)r,H + z(j)1 ) (63)
On the other hand, the time derivative of U (j)(e
(j)
r,H)
along with (30) can be expressed as
U˙ (j)(e
(j)
r,H) =− e(j)Tr,H [∇g(j)(y(j)r )−∇g(j)(yˆ(j)r )]
− η(j)e(j)Tr,H (e(j)r,H + z(j)1 )
≤− η(j)e(j)Tr,H (e(j)r,H + z(j)1 ) (64)
where the inequality follows from the convexity of g(j).
Using the comparison principle [46], under the same ini-
tial condition e˜
(j)
r,H(0) = e
(j)
r,H(0), (63) and (64) imply
U (j)(e
(j)
r,H) ≤ U (j)(e˜(j)r,H), or equivalently, ‖e(j)r,H(t)‖ ≤
‖e˜(j)r,H(t)‖ ≤ e−η
(j)te
(j)
r,H(0) + Ψ(η
(j), z
(j)
1 (t), t0, t).
Directly solving (31) and applying the triangular in-
equality, ‖e(j)v,H(t)‖ can be bounded by (33).
Appendix III
Proof of Lemma 3. Under the healthy conditions, in-
tegrating both sides of Eq. (61) yields
V (t)− V (0) ≤− (η − 2n+ 2)
∫ t
τ=0
yTr (τ)Lyr(τ)dτ
−
n∑
i=1
∫ t
τ=0
zTi (τ)Cizi(τ)dτ
which implies that
1
2
‖z(j)1 (t)‖2 + c(j)1
∫ t
τ=0
‖z(j)1 (τ)‖2dτ ≤ V (0).
Given Assumption 3 and definition of Ω¯, we have
1
2c
(j)
1
‖z(j)1 (t)‖2 +
∫ t
τ=0
‖z(j)1 (τ)‖2dτ ≤ Ω¯/c(j)1
In addition, from Theorem 1 we know z
(j)T
1 S(z
(j)
1 /δ
(j))
is bounded, which yields |z(j)1,s(t)| < δ(j)(t) for any t ≥ 0.
To prove the result we suppose, for contradiction, there
exists s ∈ {1, · · · ,m} such that |z(j)1,s(t)| ≥ δ(j)(t) > k(j)b .
According to the form of S and the prescribed perfor-
mance technique [39], ‖S(z(j)1 /δ(j))‖ converges to +∞.
Then z
(j)T
1 S(z
(j)
1 /δ
(j)) ≥ k(j)b ‖S(z(j)1 /δ(j))‖ → +∞
as t → ∞, a contradiction, which in turn implies
‖z(j)1 (t)‖ <
√
mδ(j)(t).
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